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The aim of my  paper is to try to explain why so far Sweden – known otherwise for being a strongly com-
mitted  United Nations member,  its recognition as a generous giver of aid for humanitarian purposes
and its solidarity towards liberation movements in what not so long ago was called The Third World - so
far  has been a very hesitant  member of the European community. In fact, Sweden only joined EU in
1995 after more than three decades of, sometimes fierce, discussion. Up until the end of the Cold war
(ending 1989) the official reason for Sweden to stay outside of the EU was its commitment to “nonalign-
ment during peace time in order to be neutral in a war situation” as its been stated in most official docu-
ments regarding Swedish foreign policy since the end of WWII. However, there is every reason to
believe that although the principle of neutrality have been important it is not the only –or even the most
principal - cause why  Swedes have been so late to join the EU. Neither does it explain why EU still after
ten years of membership seems to be so unpopular among the Swedish public. In all-European public
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opinion polls Swedes are among the most critical of EU-citizens. Moreover, there are so far almost
nobody who argues for a more federalist structure of EU politics. Rather, the so-called principle of
inter-governmentalism is by far the most popular choice both for Swedish voters and politicians
Hence, the aim here is to discuss why this is so
Broadly, I think there are three historical reasons behind this fact. First I think we need to emphasise
the historical development of a peculiar Swedish social structure. Secondly, and linked to this , the
emergence of the so called “Swedish model” – or what Swedes refer to when they talk about the
Swedish model. And thirdly, and this especially refers to Sweden´s reluctance to joint the EMU, the wish
to preserve an independent monetary system and with this the ability to adjust the value of the Swedish
currency and instead  keep up a regime of flexible exchange rates.
First, then , the social structure of Sweden is still – even though much have changed - known for its
quite stable egalitarian social structure- quite low income differences in a comparative perspective -
within a ethnical homogenous population combined with a developed sense of democratic conscious-
ness. The main explanation for this peculiar social structure is perhaps first and formost the strong local
and peasant roots of present day Sweden, the importance of a free peasantry for the development of
democratic institutions as well as for economic development since the 18th century. However, of major
importance is also one of the main consequences of this egalitarian social structure: the particularly
important role of the labour movement together with other linked popular movements with their histori-
cal emergence in the late 19th century in Sweden labelled as the rise of the “popular movements”; the
temperance movement, the free church, the cooperative movement, of course the trade unions and the
political party of the working class: the Social Democratic Party.  However, as I shall try to show further
on, these two historical factors are clearly linked. Thus, the rise of the “popular movements” and the
great role it has played here is unthinkable - of course - without the earlier Swedish history in general
and without the role of the peasantry in Swedish history in particular.
Hence, up until the 19th century the Swedish economy was characterized by an almost total agrarian
dominance and its development seemed to be tied to the well-being of the free independent peasant. Of
course, there were also some sections of production not organiseded by peasants, for example the  min-
ing industry which were of importance especially in the 17th and 18th century and the state subsidized
manufactories – centralized almost modern  factories as they were - in the late 18th and early 19th cen-
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turies. But on the whole these sectors were of small importance indeed compared to a an agrarian sec-
tor which still in the middle of the 19th century  employed more than 80% of the total workforce.
Further, it is clear that the Swedish industrial breakthrough of the 19th century to a great extent relied
on small-scale production with a basis in agriculture; to a great extent relying on the independent small-
scale producer as in the ideal picture put forward by the Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century. 
I have already stated  the importance of the independent small-scale producer system  for the rise of the
“popular movement” in Sweden during the late 19th century. Let me try to explain:
In a general sense both the free church movement from the 1870’s , the abolitionist  or temperance
movement from the 1880’s as well as the labour movement from the 1890’s were a consequence of the
industrial breakthrough during the same period. It was mostly the lower middle classes - who’s condi-
tion very much had been transformed by industrial revolution - and the working classes - at least up to a
point created by the same revolution - that were drawn into these popular movements. This of course
happened in many other countries than Sweden during the same period. However, the actual form in
which this was done in Sweden was at least up to a point original. First, the social character of the in-
dustrialisation process was a factor of importance. Hence, the industrial revolution during the 19th cen-
tury in the Swedish context was a very broad process including different social strata and people of dif-
ferent origin and position.
It included a broad base of small scale production sometimes developing into big industry - with a base
in agriculture and local crafts. Up until the early 20th century -at least for most branches - it relied on
many small firms in which the owner often were taking part of production activities as well as “manag-
ing” the firm. Thus in a relative sense, industrialisation Sweden took a much more “democratic” form - if
that word is allowed in this context - than is usually admitted  when one only  concentrates on large
firms, the big financial banks etc - which definitively were of a minority. And the implications of this are
not hard to understand: a sense of harmony and compromise between small-scale owners of industrial
property and labourers were so to speak built into the system from the beginning and was really, at its
roots, an effect of the industrialisation process as such in Sweden. It created a social system of produc-
tion where there were a gliding scale of positions taken; from peasant to small-scale industrialist, from
agricultural worker over part time industrial worker to the classical industrial worker. This shifting
structure lead to great flexibility - as well as to the sense of harmony that always has been strongly
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emphasised with regard to Swedish industrial relations. Further, it is clear that the “popular move-
ments” from the late 19th century were to become permeated by such values - up to a point even the
labour movement with its emphasis during this century on pragmatic compromise rather than on clear-
cut and open class struggle.
However, it was not only in this economic or social sense that the older economic history of Sweden
gave a contribution to the rise and development of the “popular movements” in Sweden during the late
19th century. The first “real” trade union began to appear in the 1880’s and early 1890’s. The Swedish
Social Democratic Party was founded in 1889 and served very much as a central organisation  for the
unions before The General Trade Union Council (Landsorganisationen) was established in 1898. It is
often recognized that the early labour movement in Sweden to a great extent borrowed an organisation-
al set up, its spirit as an organisation etc from the a bit earlier established free church and temperance
movement. However, it can also be stated that all these “popular movements” borrowed their forms of
organisation and governance  from existing democratic or pre-democratic institutions on the local level;
the rural “commune, the village organisa-tion etc. Thus, such institutions were to a great extent a plant
school of the later voluntary popular organisations, where rules of “fairness” and agreement, a way to
put forward proposals and to settle disagreement was taught and articu-lated.  Its spirit of democratic
values and of compromise was  thus inherited by the popular movement - and this was probably a very
important factor behind the subsequent democratic development of Swedish society during the 20th
century in which the popular movements - no doubt - played a leading role.
2.
Secondly, we turn to the role and implications of the so-called “Swedish model”. The role of the popular
movement, particularly the labour movement, a relatively high degree of social equality and a grass root
level for of local democracy  is the most basic  underlying structure for the so much discussed “Swedish
model”  during the 20th century.  The kernel of this modern Swedish model was made up by the organ-
ized collaboration between especially three parties: the employers, organised labour and the state.
However, also popular movements as well as other interest groups, such as the smaller peasants, were
also included in this matrix. The concept  “Swedish model” can certainly be used to denote different
things. However, in its proper historical sense it serves to characterise the kind of collaborative frame-
work which developed since the end of the 19th century and experienced its definite breakthrough dur-
ing the 1930’s with the Social Democracy’s rise to power and its application of the so-called “cow—trad-
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ing”  policy (the compromise between the social democrats and the peasant party in 1933). This most
certainly laid the ground for the long period of social democratic governments in Sweden (1932-1976,
1982-91 and again in 1994-2006) as well as the establishment of a particular Swedish welfare state.
Thus, the concept “Swedish model” helps to define the particular relations which evolved in the labour
market after the middle of the 1930’s. Hence, the trade unions were successful especially in the middle-
war years to come to agreement with the employers and their organisations not only on questions of pay
and general work conditions but also with regard to the rationalisation of industry,its ability to innovate
and adapt new technology, etc. Especially the general agreements in the 1930’s and 1940’s between the
Swedish confederation of Trade unions (LO) which controlled a majority of Swedish workers in this
period and the mighty Swedish employers Association (SAF) has been seen as especially important in
this sense. Their building up of an organizational structure through voluntary and binding collective
agreements have in fact also been picked out as a main characteristics of the “Swedish model”.
Also in a comparative perspective the Swedish employers were positive towards social legislation etc.,
long before the First world war - in fact there is clear breakthrough for such a more active interest
already in the 1880’s and 1890’s. Further, in Sweden this interest from the employers side - as well as
their direct campaigning for such ends in the Swedish parliament during this period - seems to have
been directly correlated to the rise of organised labour. Thus the development of independent trade
unions and working class political organisations were clearly linked both to the development of social
legislation and the introduction of social welfare-policies and also more generally to the rise of an
“organised capitalism” in Sweden from the late 1900’s characterized by a quite close collaboration
between employers and state.
However, what makes a big difference from most other countries, Swedish employers already from this
early beginning recognised organized labour within this matrix of collaboration. Without doubt, this con-
struction of a three-sided constellation of forces was of crucial importance for the future. Thus in
Sweden three important and powerful organisations in a broad sense - the LO, SAF and the state -
already from the turn of the century created a system of counter-balancing forces. Of course, this by no
means implied some kind of harmonious integration or cooperation between the threesome. On the con-
trary, clear-cut oppositions and clashes of interest have not been uncommon, for example between LO
and SAF in the early 1910’s and the early 1930’s as well as between the state and the employers in the
SWEDEN: THE RELUCTANT EUROPEAN MEMBER. 203
late 1920’s or in the middle of the 1930’s when the latter protested against any interference in the free
collective bargaining process which the Social Democratic government prepared for - and in this resist-
ance paradoxically enough were supported by the LO. Rather, the peculiarity of the Swedish model has
been that such disagreements has been solved within a general commitment to industrial peace and sta-
bility, growth and rationalisation among the three members of the constel-lation. Thus, in relation to for
example Britain the relationship between state and employers has always also included a third part, a
powerful and very centralised trade union structure.
3.
It seems clear that both the Swedish labour market and industrial relations system – the Swedish model
in short - currently is facing great challenges from Europeisation; i.e. EU and its policies of economic,
political and social integration. To a great extent the current reluctance toward the EU  is and has been
the threat that this process implies for what we here have called “the Swedish model”. 
However, one can ask what really is left of the “old” Swedish model given the last two decades of histo-
ry. For many years - from the beginning of the 1950’s and well into the 1980’s Sweden was well known
for its particular system of  industrial relations, the Swedish (or perhaps better the Scandinavian)
model. However, as a consequence of a lower growth rate combined  with inflation (stagflation) - as well
as from influences from the primarily Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal discourse – parts of this system collapsed
already during the late 1980’s. Not only was the central agreement between the great central organisa-
tions on the labour market - in particular the central agreement s between LO and SAF - replaced by
agreements on the branch level. Also the employers in SAF withdraw from any kind of collaboration on
the central level with LO after a famous decision taken by the SAF board in 1992. Hence, during the
1990’s and still today the employers are reluctant to negotiate openly with LO. Last year this was made
even more manifest by the dismantling of SAF and its replacement by new organisation, Svenskt nar-
ingsliv (Swedish industry) which is explicitly stated to have no bargaining functions at all but rather to
be a lobby organisation. 
However, at the same, many argue that something of a  new Swedish model was introduced in the late
1990’s very much related to the challenge from Europe and not the least from the introduction of EMU
and ECB. The general implications and effects of introducing the single currency and the ECB are well
known. With a single currency there will be no possibility for a single member state to devalue its cur-
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rency in order, for example, to defend its competitive position within a specific branch or the economy
as a whole. Hence, the competitive struggle between different member states will more directly affect
the national labour markets or segments of it. For example too high wage increases, above the level of
the productivity increase in a certain country, will certainly mean a loss of competitive edge for that
country or a particular branch in a country.
Against this background the so-called Industrial agreement in 1997 started a process of renewal in
Swedish industrial relations. Once again, the importance of the export industry in setting the limits for
the wage bargaining in other sectors and the low inflation made it possible to increase real wages with-
out increasing the inflation rate.  This agreement has certainly been important also for the recovery of
the Swedish industry, the low inflation rate since then and the steady drop of unemployment. Hence it
seems that the social partners in Sweden have learnt the lesson from the 1970’s and 1980’s with  high
inflation and high nominal wages, but only a tiny rise  of real wages.  It has also with the Industrial
agreement adopted itself to the new political economy situation in Europe and the rules of EMU which
are directly obvious for those who join and more indirectly so for those who stay out (but not at all less
real!)
Hence, there might be room for some optimism. With the inauguration of the so-called industrial agree-
ment in 1997 we have seen much less conflicts on the labour market as well as a wage increase which
does not threaten the inflation and stability goals put up by the governments which aims to keep up
Sweden’s competitiveness without having to use the means of monetary policy  (devaluation etc). From
the perspective of the wage earners a very low inflation combined with some nominal wage increases
have also lead to a steady growth of real income during the last four or five years.
Among the general Swedish public – not only by trade unionis but also much more widely – it is feared
that  Europeisation might challenge and threaten this  “Swedish model”.  It is feared that increased
competition, the strengthening of a common market for goods, capital and labour will challenge the sta-
bility of this model (which so far has gained Sweden as far as it is possible to judge) Many fear that
increased integration – together with economic globalisation – will  destroy the institutional basis of the
old Swedish model: the high level of organisation on the labour market, the so far very powerful system
of collective bargaining, etc. The result will be less independence of global market forces, increased
competition and less welfare, it is feared. Hence, the reluctance towards EU is to a large extent also a
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reluctance against too much globalisation and economic integration.  
4.
However, it is not only the industrial relations system that is at stake.  As is well known Sweden –
together with other Nordic welfare states have kept up an ambitious social welfare policy. Sweden’s
model have been recognised – using the categories developed by  Gösta  Esping-Andersen – as an arch-
type of the universalist  welfare state, providing welfare not on the basis of income but  as a token of cit-
izenship, a positive right. Sweden has also been recognised as a high tax state – certainly because of its
high ambitions in the social field. One of the main fears – especially within Social democracy (still being
the state bearing party in Sweden) – there is a fear that the further development of a common market –
and more political integration within the EU -  will lead to problems to finance the welfare sector in the
future.
However, the paradox is that Sweden well before the stability pact inaugurated by the EU – or for that
matter before the rise of EMU institutions – could have made any impact Sweden it began to reform it
welfare sector which in practice meant both a lowering of costs as well as making it more “employment
friendly” to use the current Commission language.  The main reason for this was the great unemploy-
ment crisis which hit Sweden in 1991-1992 implying unemployment figures not seen in this country
since the 1920’s (10-12%). As an effect of the rise of unemployment social costs dwindled – this in
effect was caused by that in Sweden the state provides unemployment benefits as well as finance an
ambitious labour market policy with the aim to activate the unemployed (work fare instead of welfare
compensation!). As the Swedish social security system is built upon the principle of compensation for
loss of income, for example due to unemployment, this means that in the middle of the 1990’s remedies
had to be sought to lower overall social costs so that the budget deficit would not go totally out of hand.
Hence we saw a number of cuts as well as reforms within this sector already during the middle part of
the 1990’s. Thus  the social security system during the 1990’s was characterised by a large number of
changes in the systems (compared to other periods), and the changes made were mainly of restrictive
character, i.e. they led to less generosity and range. The most significant changes concerned qualifica-
tion rules and levels of compensation. Hence, the reforms of the 1990’s have clearly downsized the
Swedish welfare state, in terms of institutional generosity. During the years between 1991 and 97 there
were several restrictive reforms in sickness benefits and sick pay. In 1993 there was a restrictive reform
of unemployment benefits, and 1994-95 there were reforms in parental benefits and a reduction in the
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universal child allowances.  Moreover, in 1994 a pension reform was launched including new qualifying
conditions and indexing rules, which were well-funded bur less generous than the previous system.
Moreover just to give some further examples in 1997 an income test of widow pensions was introduced
for those below the standard age of retirement.  
In the same year a national scale rate for guaranteed minimum income benefits was introduced.
Between 1998-99 a number of restrictive measures has been introduced to the old system, for instance a
lower basic pension to married pensioners and a 6 percent reduction for early retirement benefits.
Between 1998-99 stricter rules for the income testing of housing allowances and reduction of allowances
for wealthier recipients were carried through. 
In the middle of the 1990’s  - at the peak of the economic crisis - the rate of sickness benefits was low-
ered to 75 per cent of previous salary while in 1998 it once again was increased up to its previous level,
80 per cent. In 1997 a parliamentary committee on sickness-work injuries benefit was established.
Closer co-ordination of the two benefits and the option of privatising the work accident component of
the work-injury insurance was recommended. There was also a debate over the possibility of transfer-
ring the whole work injuries/sickness cash benefit to the social partners, but this option was rejected.
After 1996 changes were made to the arrangements for social support in order to improve the co-ordi-
nation between national and local authorities to ensure that everyone in need receives a minimum level
of income.
Thus to some extent Sweden has already made cuts in its welfare system in order to tighten its budget –
which at least during last year ran up to a high surplus - as well as making it compatible to the demands
of the ECB and the stability pact. However, for the moment there is two fears: 1) that a general econom-
ic crisis in Western Europe (imported from the U S) will lead to renewed demands for cuts in the wel-
fare sector, and 2) that EMU and European integration will lead to such effects in any case.
The second fear is on of the most important causes why Sweden – at least the social democrats in power
and the former (up to some weeks ago) prime minister Göran Persson in particular – remains very scep-
tical indeed towards any initiative the develop a more federal policy for Europe. So far Sweden is one of
the greatest supporters of the open method of co-ordination and of soft law, particularly regarding the
social sector and the labour market. This might seem a bit paradoxical given the fact that Sweden have a
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long tradition and experience of social welfare and could because of this have a lot to contribute with to
European level discussions on this topic.
This fear is most clearly seen with regard to taxes. As is well known the EU in its employment strategy
suggests that member states shall lower taxes especially on low paid wages in order to increase wage
and labour market flexibility as well as to increase employment. The response to such recommenda-
tions, most strongly set in the Commissions answer to the Swedish action plans of 2000 and 2001, has so
far been very negative indeed. Thus it is stated in the Swedish action plan for 2000 that:
“The primary purpose of taxes is to finance the welfare system and thereby contribute to social
security and justice”. This is stated in the Swedish Action plan for employment 2000. It is certainly
true that the Swedish welfare state as we know it is seriously challenged by the EU recommenda-
tion that we should lower income taxes and labour costs. Therefore, lowering income taxes by about
one percent causes a lot of controversy.
Once again in 2001 the commission’s advice to Sweden prior to the new action plan 2001 was to
lower non- wage labour costs and taxes and to set up a goal for this. (Seven other member states also
received the commission’s advice about lowering their taxes, but only Sweden received the advice of
setting a goal). However, up until now there is has been no political will in Sweden in favour of setting a
target or a goal concerning the tax burden or non-wage labour costs. To set goals and then work to
reach these is a common method in Swedish policy. We have goals for employment and inflation. But
concerning tax policy there is no will to do this. Employment and disposable income are issues regarded
as more important to deal with. Lowering taxes is not viewed as a political goal whatsoever.  Even the
new government with Fredrik Reinfelt  seems not to be too keen to cut taxes – even though they have
said that they will cut them for the lowest incomes
The question about cutting down taxes for the lowest earners is a particularly tough one for Swedish
actors. There have been two state committees (1992 and 1997) dealing with the possible reduction of
non-wage labour costs, which still has not resulted in any political decisions. To subsidise the private
service sector by decreasing employer contributions is not of any current interest, as it probably - at the
moment of course (who will know for the future) would lead to overheating situation in that sector. 
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5.
As everybody know, of course, Sweden has so far chosen to stay out of the European Monetary union
This can largely be explained with the same factors which I already have emphasised: the fear of too
close cooperation and integration with the rest if Europe.  However, also another important factor must
be emphasised here at the end of this talk.
As I already have explained the often used argument why Sweden for so long stayed outside the EU is
Sweden´s status as a neutral country during the Cold War. However, at least as important has been the
strong feeling in Sweden to preserve its independence in terms of monetary policies. Hence, in the
beginning of the 1970’s when Sweden was close to join the EEC – almost 25 years before we actually
took the step – the  real reason for not joining was the preservation of monetary independence. It was
only after the presentation of the Werner plan – the forerunner of the EMU – that Sweden decided that
it did not longer would seek membership –once again using the  foreign policy neutrality argument.
It is no secret that Sweden during the last seventy years have gained much from its  - sometimes quite
skilfully administrated it must be admitted, but also sometimes by chance -  independent monetary
arrangements, from it s open devaluation of the currency  and from its floating exchange rates. Hence,
Sweden´s export  industry gained much from the abolishment of gold in 1932 and the successive
(undervalued) peg to the Pound Sterling. After the Second world war we have devaluated the krona
numerous times, especially frequently  in the 1970’s and early 1980’s. Since the beginning of the 1990’s
Sweden have a floating exchange rate system. Most independent experts are in agreement that especial-
ly the export economy has gained much from these policies – an most probably also the economy as
such. Without doubt this is of utmost importance to notice if one shall be ale to understand the result of
the EMU referendum in Sweden two years ago.
*
However, in the  end,  we must conclude that a main reason why Sweden has stayed a reluctant member
of the European Union is that is still feel a strong commitment to “the Swedish model” and to the
Swedish welfare state.  The fear of that it is threatened by Europe explains to a large extent the present
Euro-scepticism. The paradox is however that Sweden during the last decade or so has carried through
a number of reform as well as cuts in the welfare sector in order to be more competitive. So there might
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perhaps not be so much reason to worry.  However, as we know from historical enquiry generally mental
maps or models are difficult to get rid of. There is what social scientist have described a strong force of
path dependence involved here. To what extent  there will be a change of path in the future is an open
question  but depend largely on what is happening on the global scene. Sweden is a small country – but
seems sometimes to forget this rather obvious fact! 
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